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1Summary
As the wars on the Balkans emerged in the early 1990’s and continued to
colour the European reality over almost a decade, a fierce debate regarding
questions of guilt, necessary actions, and roads to peace was initiated. In
Sweden it was not as broad and competent as in other European countries,
but it did allow certain odd features in the everyday life, such as a party, ‘the
Sarajevo-list’, which was mainly occupied with the issue of breaking the
siege around Sarajevo. The large groups of refugees that fled the countries,
or were rescued out of them, were sheltered in several European countries,
but also in other parts of the world, ranging from the USA to Indonesia.
Currently, the re-construction of the region is underway, and countries are
offering aid in exchange for stability and order – the Balkans are indeed still
far from over with intolerance and conflicts. Since the region has in one way
or another occupied the interest and efforts of so many, it is of common
interest that justice be shed over the conflict. The international community
initiated the idea of an international tribunal to hold the responsible
individuals accountable for their actions. It has now been working for
several years, and reached its peak with the indictment and trial against the
former president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Slobodan
Milosevic in 2001. With point of departure in this indictment, the thesis
wishes to scrutinise and penetrate the effects of individual accountability for
international crimes that have been orchestrated by an entity far greater than
to include only one man, or even merely the top executives. Arguments in
favour of the possibility to hold the state as such responsible for acts of for
instance genocide have been a valuable and important contribution to the
dialogue. Regardless of the interesting implications of such an aspect, the
main issue is constantly voiced: can states be prosecuted? This study will
give no answer to that question, but will try to illuminate the complex web
of responsible actors, and of course the danger of holding one person
accountable for the acts of a political and legal entity, such as the state.
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3Abbreviations
ATCA Alien Tort Claims Act
FSIA The Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act
FRY Federal republic of Yugoslavia
ICC Permanent International Criminal Court
ICJ International Court of Justice
ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia
ILA International Law Association
ILC International Law Commission
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JNA National Army of Yugoslavia
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1.1 THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE THESIS
When individuals are tried for having violated international law, questions
of justice, truth, fairness and purpose are being raised. These issues are even
more emphasized when it comes to the prosecution of heads-of-state and the
commission of the crimes that actually were state policy at the time of the
conduct. If the presumption is that individuals cannot cast the blame of their
guilt on their state, then the logical consequence has to be that states too
cannot hide their guilt and responsibility behind the punishment of
individuals. In order to receive a fair and efficient legal frame-work for the
prosecution of international crimes, especially when they consist of crimes
such as genocide, aggression, war crimes, and crimes against humanity,
holding the factually and legally correct entity or subject responsible for the
commission is essential. The indictment and trial against the former, or at
the time of the filing of the indictment, the sitting head-of-state of
Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, have evoked some concern regarding the
effect and purpose of holding heads-of-state individually responsible of the
crimes committed. Are processes such as the one against Milosevic, or those
against General Noriega at the beginning of the 1990’s or General Pinochet
at the end of that decade stemming from domestic jurisdictions, pursuing a
good and just cause? Not targeting the good will of all these efforts, doubt is
linked to the very nature of the system of the prosecution of individuals
substituting the place of the state. As will be shown, the notion of
prosecuting a state for its actions because of its sponsorship and approval is
not imbedded in positive law. Through innovative drafting and the inherent
potential of certain legislation such as the 1949 Genocide Convention, the
International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on State Responsibility, and
the establishment of the Permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) in
The Hague, a sphere for, at least the discussion of state liability for certain
international crimes is being created. Thus far, a rather extensive case law
from domestic jurisdictions on the prosecution of various government
5officials, including of heads-of-state has displayed a rather dubious record.
Recently the International Court of Justice judged against a too extensive
extraterritorial approach by national states to try foreign holders of official
positions within a government, and narrowed the scope of municipal
legislations with universal appetite. Focusing on the pressing charges
against states through civil suits by individual plaintiffs, these have showed
to be virtually impotent as the collection on the compensatory and punitive
damages in many instances have not been possible. This scenario is the
same in cases against individual perpetrators of foreign governments. The
future of universal jurisdiction on the national level against individual
government officials seems as fruitless as impotent. On the international
level, jurisprudence and recent developments show a high degree of activity
on both the criminal as well as the civil front. Concurrently with the
proceedings against the perpetrators from the former Yugoslavia at the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) is trying a civil suit brought forward by
Bosnia and Herzegovina against Yugoslavia on the interpretation of the
Genocide Convention. Should the case develop further and not be dropped,
it could become a significant step in the evolution of state accountability,
although merely in a civil sense.
1.2 METHODOLOGY AND AIM OF THE STUDY
The main issues I will explore, are connected to the questioning of the
validity and purpose of prosecuting individual perpetrators, and indeed even
heads-of-state for the crimes of their governments. What is it that the
principle of superior command responsibility looses, when it implies an
embodiment in the sole perpetrator for a state policy, sponsored and directed
by the complex entity of a state as in the case of Milosevic at the ICTY?
With point of departure in the case against Milosevic case in particular,
what dangers could evolve or do already exist when the world community
acknowledges such a personalization of the guilt of a state mechanism?
What fractions of the responsible community are left out, and how does one
deal with such a scenario, especially having in mind the prime goals of law
6enforcement relating to a war crime scene, such as truth, peace and justice,
for the benefit of the people victimized by the crimes. Finally, focus will be
mainly tuned in on a legal framework introduced to take on the task of
examining state responsibility for crimes, even of the kind committed in the
former Yugoslavia. Is it possible, and at all wise to target state entities for
crimes sponsored by them, instead of the individual in the position of a
superior commander?
In focusing on both the national and international jurisdictional spheres, this
thesis is set to examine the difference between state and individual
accountability for criminal conduct, especially regarding violations of
human rights and humanitarian law. The situation of prosecuting individuals
for international crimes today suffers from blurred boundaries between
international human rights, humanitarian law and criminal law. The thesis
will sweep over some domestic jurisdictions and jurisprudence, in particular
the U.S., and also dwell upon the difference between the civil and criminal
approaches of holding subjects of law liable for their crimes and the rather
bad experience they have provided in cases relating to abuses in foreign
countries. On a parallel basis with the domestic trials, there has been a
constant international urge to move back to the Nuremberg model with
international tribunals and prosecutions, most recently realized through the
establishment of the ICC in The Hague. In this regard the problem of
defining the international crimes has once again opened a battleground and
provoked some inconsistent solutions as to the existence of the act of state.
The cases of Pinochet and Milosevic, are the two cases that most clearly
witness about both these trends - the domestic and the international
approach. In addition, almost an outsider in the company, the case of Bosnia
and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia before the ICJ, will prove the purpose of an
upcoming trend and the possibility of state accountability for international
crimes on an international level.
72 National Courts, National
Jurisdictions
2.1 PRINCIPLES OF JURISDICTION
International criminal law has traditionally limited the scope of the
enforcement of jurisdiction to a state’s own territory, or to the application of
its criminal law on offenders for crimes committed abroad, should the
offender eventually later on enter its territory. “The spatial scope” of each
state’s criminal code is more or less fit to react on criminalized commissions
abroad, whereby its domestic courts are equipped with the competence to
prosecute the offenders. International criminal law in this sense is not really
international, but municipal, criminalizing acts as if committed within the
territory of the state. States cannot, however, regulate the prosecution and
punishment of these persons alone, but will have to rely on multilateral
conventions and bilateral agreements in order to expand their extraterritorial
competence and jurisdiction. A universally applicable convention regulating
the jurisdiction of states does not exist. Hence, states have traditionally had
to rely on intra-territorial jurisdiction, based on the principles of territoriality
and citizenship. The main principles of international criminal jurisdiction
may be described in four variables: the place of the commission, the
character of the offender, the character of the victim, the character of the
offence committed.1 The main jurisdictional claims are based on the
principles of territory, protection, nationality of the offender (active
personality principle), nationality of the victim (passive personality
principle) and universality. Among these, the territoriality jurisdiction is the
most common, where the state will actually be able to prosecute through its
domestic courts. The personality and protection jurisdictions are not as
frequently used, but do exist.2 The ICJ in the Lotus case recognized the
                                                                
1 Iain Cameron, The Protective Principle of International Criminal Jurisdiction, Aldershot.
Brookfield, USA. Hong Kong. Singapore. Sydney; Dartmouth, 1999, pp. 10-12
2 William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law – The Crimes of Crime, Camebridge,
University Press, 2000, p. 353
8former.3 Universal jurisdiction, despite its broad scope of potential states
willing to prosecute, is limited as to the number of crimes for which a state
may charge an alleged offender with. In customary law only crimes of
piracy, slave trade, and traffic in children and women are derived, but
through multilateral treaties jurisdiction has been admitted over more
crimes. These include hijacking, piracy, and attacks against diplomats,
nuclear safety, terrorism, apartheid and torture. Prosecutions against
genocide, which are based on the territoriality jurisdiction, are as a rule
undermined by the usual reluctance of the state where the crimes were
committed to prosecute. This may be conditioned by a situation where the
perpetrator being a governmental official is sheltered by the fact that he is
still in office, or of a state’s more general dislike or fear of exposing a
controversial past with the effect of provoking and stirring up too many
suppressed feelings of guilt and shame. The Genocide Convention does not
provide for an application of universal jurisdiction on the crime of genocide.
In its Article VI it states that either courts of the forum state should try the
war criminals, or international tribunals with such jurisdiction. 4 And yet, as
we shall see later on, Article IX does provide for a resort to the ICJ in cases
of disagreement regarding the interpretation of the Genocide Convention.
2.2 STATE IMMUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS
The law of state immunity has undergone considerable changes and is today
as most features of international law able to show up an ambiguous face,
depending on where and by whom dealt with. Evolving from an absolute
sphere of untouchables, states have descended to a more concrete level,
absorbing the notions of the perhaps most strong force of the last 50 years –
the development of the human rights. In the early 20th century, state
immunity carried the dignity of absolute immunity. Although the attempt of
making the individual a subject of international law, efforts of creating this
space for individuals and the remedies for violations of their human rights
have been mostly frequent on the national level. During this period, the law
                                                                
3 Lotus Case, France v. Turkey, The P.C.I.J., Series A, No.10 (1927)
4 Schabas, pp. 353-355
9of the state has also developed from the times when absolute immunity was
the predominant concept of it. Focusing on the nature of state activity, rather
than the purposes, will provide for opportunities to properly qualify acts as
acts of state or not.5 Common to the tendency of extensive drafting of
national statutes on state immunity that continued in especially the U.S. and
U.K. was also accompanied by the drafting of conventions on state
immunity by the ILC and the International Law Association (ILA). All these
efforts had the purpose of reducing the activities protected by immunity in
common, and instead allowing jurisdiction over situations where a foreign
state had caused death, personal injury or damages to property. The novelty
here was the disregard of the private or governmental character of the
conduct. Despite this attempt, domestic courts have been cautious to admit
human rights cases, and have been more likely to admit the violating states
immunity protection on the basis that the conduct was a governmental act,
or rejecting the case because of a lack of territorial link to the forum state.6
Sovereign immunity is by one definition “the right of a State and its organs
not to be held responsible for their acts by the judicial organs of other
States”. 7 While the state remains responsible for actions, it is free from the
examination of other states‘ courts and authorities. Counter-measures
provided for in international law are still applicable and may be utilized
against such a state. What the immunity defense legally exercises for the
acting state is thus that it protects it from legal scrutiny by the forum state.
The most recent development of state immunity is that of further limitation
of the sovereignty of it, and more recognition for the human rights
approach, and the individual as a “partial subject of international law”. 8
Evolving from the past of national states and sovereigns, the concept of state
immunity was previously more narrowly intended and expressed as “that of
the dignity of sovereigns”, also pointing at the personalizing connection of it
                                                                
5 Jurgen Bröhmer, State Immunity and the Violations of Human Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
The Hague/Boston, 1997, p. 1
6 Bröhmer, p. 2
7 Bröhmer, p. 3
8 Bröhmer, pp. 3, 8
10
towards the sovereign ruler. Another expression less anachronistic and more
close to the current situation than the above mentioned, is the Latin maxim
par in parem non habet imperium, advocating an egalitarian view on
sovereign states, and thus giving no sovereign the privilege to exercise
jurisdiction over another sovereign.9 As a derivative of the concept of
sovereignty, or disguised in the shape of non-interference, state immunity is
in a way a challenge to a prosperous climate of highlighting, prosecuting
and suing human rights violations. The concept of sovereignty impresses the
non-hierarchical relationship between states and emphasizes their positions
as the primary subjects in international law - par in parem non habet
imperium. Another aspect of sovereignty is attached to the notion of “state”
– the “organisational entity “state”’ built up as an individual structure,
operating and existing but not as a purpose in itself, but rather inherently
controlling the concept of “state”, i.e. performing duties with the character
of guarantees for external and internal peace, and social security for its
citizens.10 With time the concept altered and with the turn of the First World
War it was confronted with the relativity approach. Jurisdictional immunity
was the pendant to sovereignty, protecting the state from interfering legal
submissions from other states, and defending its external frontiers. The
absolute immunity doctrine was the prevailing and exclusive theory on
statehood for a long time.11 Again, at the turn of the 20th century, the
restrictive theory of immunity was introduced, limiting the scope and rules
of the traditional aspects and tasks of states.12 Not only states as such enjoy
the immunity privilege, their representatives, the heads-of-state, also take
advantage of immunity protection when made party to a suit. Even though
the head-of-state immunity is related to state immunity seen in a historical
context, the personification of the state through the sovereign ruler is no
longer adamant. There must be made a distinction between the acts and in
what capacity the head-of-state commits them. Head-of-state immunity is
linked to diplomatic immunity in situations when a head-of-state is acting
                                                                
9 Bröhmer, pp. 10-11
10 Bröhmer, p. 17
11 See The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812)
12 Bröhmer, p. 17
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outside his official capacity in a foreign country. At least this would be the
instance where the head-of-state in the capacity of an individual person
commits crimes during a state visit abroad. Should a crime evolve from an
act – private or official – where the perpetrator stands as an official
representative of the state, the rules of state immunity would be applicable.
If it is a case of a joint enterprise, his immunity as head-of-state cannot be
stretched further than that of the state.13 Further, sovereign immunity was
activated whenever a state, its property or a governmental official were
brought charges against abroad.14
2.2.1 IMMUNITY RATIONE PERSONAE AND RATIONE
MATERIAE
Other related concepts to the sovereign immunity are jurisdiction and acts of
state. Regarding the theory of jurisdiction, the links to the doctrine of
sovereign immunity are very strong. Through the power of jurisdiction,
states are capacitated to, by legislative, executive or judicial means control
relations and conducts within the territory and boundaries of a state.15  For
the country to assume its jurisdiction, the requirement is that the territorial
link is completed, or in other cases that the principle of active personality or
nationality is applicable, asserting the state jurisdiction when its nationals
are engaged in actions in a foreign country. To assume jurisdiction over
foreign nationals having committed acts against a national outside his
country of nationality, by the forum state through the passive personality
principle is yet to receive recognition. Such recognition would make a
difference and affect the possibility of providing jurisdiction for a state over
human rights violations committed abroad against its nationals in a positive
manner. On top of all this as has been indicated, universal jurisdiction as a
specific form of monitor of international crimes, is a novelty in the cluster
of different jurisdictions. The main task in a courtroom after the jurisdiction
link is set is to ascertain whether the immunity aspect is applicable to the
defendant and his status, and thus refraining the court from investigating the
                                                                
13 Bröhmer, pp. 29-31
14 See Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 665 F.Supp. 793 at 797 (N.D.Cal. 1987)
15 Bröhmer, p. 34
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state. This is referred to as immunity ratione personae and is derived from
the principle par in parem non habet imperium. Immunity ratione materiae
on the other hand involves a situation where the subject matter is
obstructing a court from adjudicating, because the case is for instance
involving administrative law of a foreign state and its official, and the forum
state happens to merely be the state where the service has been performed.16
2.3 EXTRADITION
With point of departure in the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, states have
committed themselves to criminalize the actions of war criminals and
prosecute them. Article 49 of the First Geneva Convention states the
following:
The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide
effective penal sanctions for persons committing, or ordering to be committed, any of the
grave breaches of the present Convention defined in the following Article.
Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obligation to search for persons alleged to
have committed, or to have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches and shall bring
such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers,
and in accordance with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over for
trial to another High Contracting Party concerned provided such High Contracting Party
has made out a prima facie case.  (…)
If it is not possible for one contracting party to bring the war criminals
before its own courts, it should make sure that the persons are handed over
to the forum state when also a contracting party for trial. This extradition
principle is based on the aut dedere aut judicare maxim, which implies that
when states are unable to put war criminals on trial themselves, they are
required to extradite them. However, the realization of the principle has
proved to be difficult to implement, mainly due to a lack of political
susceptibility. The application of the principle especially failed proof in the
aftermath of the Second World War when countries in Eastern Europe
showed evidence of endemic reluctance to prosecute or extradite
offenders.17 State practice tells us that extremely few cases exist where
states have indeed extradited offenders. There is only one case of precedent
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regarding genocide, that of Froduald Karamira, who was extradited from
India to Rwanda for having committed atrocities in Rwanda.18
2.4 THE EICHMANN CASE
The first really important case of international war crimes and genocide
after the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials was the Eichmann case19 from 1961,
from the domestic sphere. Not only did Eichmann, who was the mastermind
behind the “final solution” which led to the extermination of millions of
Jews in Europe, complain against his physical abduction from Argentina to
Israel. He also pointed to the UN Sixth Committee Debates on the drafting
of the Genocide Convention where no consensus was reached regarding
universal jurisdiction, but rather the territorial jurisdiction was reaffirmed as
the ruling principle. The Jerusalem District Court challenged this claim by
referring to the same debate and interpreted the outcome as one where there
was not ruled out for other countries besides the territorial state to prosecute.
Territorial jurisdiction was nothing more than a ”compulsory minimum”
upgraded by the Genocide Convention provisions to compulsory universal
jurisdiction. 20 Apart from relying on this interpretation, the District Court
also advocated the protective jurisdiction principle on the basis of the rights
of the state of Israel as the victim to protect its existence.21 The notion of a
universal jurisdiction – in the case of genocide – that the Israeli Court
initiated through the Eihmann case has also been affirmed in academic
literature.22 In the final report of the Commission of Experts for the former
Yugoslavia established by the Security Council, it was confirmed that
universal jurisdiction exists for the crimes of genocide, as well as for the
crimes against humanity. Guided by these statements, the Tadic Appeals
Judgment23 of the ICTY stated that universal jurisdiction is nowadays an
established fact in customary international law. A customary international
                                                                                                                                                                    
17 Christine Van Den Wyngaert, War Crimes, Genocide and Crimes against Humanity – Are States
Taking National Prosecution Seriously?, in International Criminal Law – Enforcement, III, edited by
Cherif Bassiouni, 2nd ed, Transnational Publishers, Inc., Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1999,  p. 229-230
18 Schabas, pp. 411-2
19 A-G Israel v. Eichmann, (1968) 36 ILR 5 (District Court, Jerusalem)
20 A-G Israel v. Eichmann, (1968) 36 ILR 5 (District Court, Jerusalem), paras. 24-5
21 Schabas, pp. 360-1
22 Schabas, p. 362
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norm of this kind is still to reconcile given the contradicting message from
the Sixth Committee Debate. This is true in regard to the debate from 1948,
but also in connection to 1998 when discussions were held on the ICC at the
Rome Diplomatic Conference. The discussions did not result in an
affirmation of the universal jurisdiction, but rather of the territorial and
active personal jurisdiction, leaving still no consensus on the matter of
universal jurisdiction, especially regarding genocide and crimes against
humanity. In the Case Concerning Application of the Genocide
Convention24 before the ICJ, which shall be examined further below, the ad-
hoc judges presented the same disagreement on the issue of universal
jurisdiction. The International Law Commission (ILC) has held in its Draft
Code of Crimes that there exists a universal jurisdiction for the crime of
genocide. In a confusing line of thinking the ILC expressed that although
universal jurisdiction cannot be extended from the intention of the language
of the Genocide Convention, it exists in customary law, and that in
conclusion, “universal jurisdiction exists for states that are not party to the
Genocide Convention, but not for those that are, a bizarre conclusion”. 25
2.5 U.S. LEGISLATION - ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT
A unique resort was provided for foreigner for well over 200 years in the
U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) for “any civil action by an alien for a
tort, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States” in its section 1350, i.e. including international law. 26 It became
famous when it dismissed the act of state doctrine in the Filartiga case27 in
1980, where U.S. courts found themselves to sit in judgment of a torture
case from Paraguay. In 1976 General Pena-Irala, the head of police in
Asuncion, had tortured and killed the 17-year-old Filartiga because of his
father’s political opposition to the Paraguayan government. The boy’s father
and sister traced the perpetrator to Brooklyn and brought damage
                                                                                                                                                                    
23 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeals Judgment, IT-94-1-A, 15 July 1999
24 Case Concerning Application of the Genocide Convention (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro)) (Preliminary Objections) I.C.J. Rep. 1993
25 Schabas, p. 365
26 Bröhmer, p. 46
27 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala (1980) 630 F. 2d. 876; 1980 (19) I.L.M. 966 U.S. Cir. Court of Appeals, 2nd
Cir.
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proceedings in 1978 in a U.S. federal district court that ruled that it did not
have jurisdiction to hear the case. The U.S. Court of Appeals however stated
that “official torture” is part of the international prohibition and “the
international consensus surrounding torture”, 28 thus not making any
difference between aliens and citizens, and sentenced Pena-Irala to
restitution. Prior to the filing of the Court of Appeal’s judgment, the accused
had been allowed to return back to Paraguay, and thus the damages were
never paid. Despite the importance and innovative approach of the case in
reaching a public condemnation of the human rights violations that were
committed, it points at several shortcomings that will later on be further
examined in a number of follow up cases. In short, the Filartiga case would
not have been realized had the defendant not been within U.S. jurisdiction,
and even so, the case still lacked assets against which the judgment could
have been enforced. Because of the protection that states enjoy through state
immunity, a case such as this would not have been able to be brought
against a state, as the actual human rights violator, for which the accused
was only an agent and “publicly pronounced” personalized actor.29 The
Amerada Hess case30 put an end to a flow of cases that were inspired by the
Filartiga decision. 31 During the Las Malvinas/Falkland War, Argentine
military aircraft outside the war zone attacked an oil tanker. The owners
United Carriers, Inc. and Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. did not file a suit in
Argentina because of the political climate at the time. The Supreme Court
held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA) was legislated with
the inclination to include jurisdiction over violations of international law as
seen in section 1605(a)(3) FSIA, and that the Act well could substitute
existing law against foreign states. The decision brought forward the still
ruling principle that the ATCA is only a lex specialis to the FSIA, and that
                                                                
28 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 1980 (19) I.L.M. 966 U.S. Cir. Court of Appeals, 2nd Cir.
29 D. J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 5th edition, London, Sweet & Maxwell,
1998, pp. 733-4
30 Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 638 F.Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y 1986), reversed,
830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. Granted, 108 S.Ct. 1466 (1988), Argentine Republic v. Amerada
Hess Shipping Corp., 109 S. Ct. 683 (1989) = 81 ILR (1990), p. 658
31 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C.Cir. 1984) cert denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985)
= 77 ILR (1988) 193 et seq. (District Court decision at 196 et seq.; Court of Appeals at 204 et seq.);
Siderman v. Republic of Argentina, No. CV 82-1772-RMT (Mcx) (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 1984); 965
F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1992); Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.D.Cir. 1985)
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the jurisdictional question for suits brought by aliens in the U.S. is to be
determined only under the auspices of the FSIA. 32 Since the FSIA did not
provide for a general immunity exception the litigants did still continue to
lean on the ATCA after the Amerada Hess judgment, but decided to focus
on individuals in governmental positions, rather than states. These suits will
not be affected by the principle of state immunity or sovereignty principle
since the defendants are individuals. Cases against former officials having
held positions in governmental bodies increased, and U.S. courts found
themselves to sit in judgment over individuals such as Philippine president
Marcos’ wife, Haitian ex-President Lieutenant General Prosper Avril, the
former Guatemalan defense minister, army general Hector Alejandro
Gramajo Morales, Indonesian general Panjaitan, former official of the
Ethiopian government Negowo, and political Bosnian Serb leader Radovan
Karadzic.33
2.5.1 THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY ACT
When in 1976 the U.S. Congress passed the legislation on state immunity,
the FSIA, it did so in order to solve some special concerns, such as the
realization of a restrictive approach to state immunity. Exceptions from the
principle rule of state immunity, in section 1605, were made for e.g.
commercial activities. From the language of the FSIA and previous case
law, it is obvious that sovereign immunity in litigations is only applicable to
state entities or their “instrumentalities”, and not to individual acts.34
Section 1605 (a)(5) FSIA contains immunity exceptions for certain cases of
tortuous conduct irrespective of whether they are governmental or private
acts. It does so only on a strict basis of the territoriality principle, which
always entails a state with the right to pursue jurisdiction over acts
committed within the state territory. 35 Through the gradual abandonment of
the acta jure gestionis/imperii distinction - the distinction between acts that
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34 Bröhmer, p. 54
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are by their nature considered as public acts, jure imperii, and those that are
private, for instance commercial acts, jure gestionis - the FSIA amplifies
another obstacle, by requiring a strong territorial nexus or contact to the
state where the tortuous conduct was committed. The damage suffered by
the plaintiff and caused by the foreign state must occur in the U.S. The U.S.
reluctance to fully apply to this rule is exemplified by the cases of Frolova
v. USSR36, the Persinger37 and McKeel38 cases (the Iran cases), and Nelson
v. Saudi Arabia39.
In 1985 von Dardel brought a compensation case against the USSR before
an American court, arising from the unlawful arrest, detention and possible
killing of his brother, the Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg. The court
reasoned that the USSR could not be able to keep its immunity in this case
since the Soviet government had explicitly violated international law, and
concluded that the international agreements exception in section 1604 FSIA
accordingly was applicable. When a state involves in an action in breach of
international law principles and norms that constructs jus cogens and
reaches the level of erga omnes, such as the infliction on Wallenberg’s
diplomatic immunity status, the court argued, the state immunity must be
denied. However, the court’s expansive and inclusive approach of reading
the waiver exceptions was not followed out. The Amerada Hess case ruled
that the FSIA was the basis for cases regarding jurisdiction in the U.S. The
judgment came to prevail over the notion that there could be some general
clause for immunity exceptions regarding cases of human rights violations
and thereby barred further development of the protective domestic approach
to human rights.
Another case that strongly affects the human rights field was the Princz
case.40 Hugo Princz, later on an American citizen, was arrested by German
                                                                
36 Frolova v. USSR, 761 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985) = 85 ILR (1991) p. 236 et seq.
37 Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1984) = 90 ILR (1992), p. 586
38 McKeel v.  Islamic Republic of Iran, 722 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1983) = 81 ILR (1990), p. 543
39 Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, 923 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1991)
40 Decision of 1 July 1994 of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
Hugo Princz  v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Appeal from the US
District Court for the District of Columbia (92cv00644), 813 F.Supp. 22 (D.D.C 1992)); 33 ILM
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officers in 1941 and sent together with his family to concentration camps.
He was forced to commit forced labor for German corporations, and
persisted under inhuman life conditions. Princz later turned to individual
court action in the U.S. and sued Germany. During the proceedings the U.S.
court denied Germany immunity. It was stated that the FSIA was not the
base for this decision because of the degree of “barbarism” of the acts
committed by this “out-law nation” contradicting everything that was held
as human and sacred.41 As regards the international agreements exception,
the court once again followed the Amerada Hess precedent stating that such
agreements must be in obvious contrast to the FSIA, which was stipulated to
argue the inadequacy of a treaty provision simply stipulating a must for the
wrongdoing party to compensate the victim, as in article 3 of the Hague
Convention which Princz referred to.42 As the basis for the waiver exception
of section 1605(a)(1) FSIA, it was held that, since Germany had violated the
fundamental jus cogens norms of international law, it had implicitly waived
its sovereign immunity. The sole violation, the court however argued,43 can
not imply waiver, but will have to be accompanied by a requirement of a
willing clear intention by the state of its compliance to take part of the trial
as a party to it. The Court of Appeals eventually dismissed the case.44
2.6 NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS IN GENERAL
Even though the former Yugoslav states have resisted the application of the
prosecution and punishment at national courts, the political, and in certain
occasions military pressure has been so overwhelming, that in fact the ICTY
                                                                                                                                                                    
(1994), p. 1483. Plaintiff’s petition to the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari was
denied on 17 January 1995 (Hugo Princz  v. Federal Republic of Germany, No. 94-909), 115 S.Ct.
923 (1995)
41 Bröhmer, p. 79
42 Bröhmer, p. 79
43 Bröhmer, p. 80
44 In her dissenting opinion, Judge Patricia Wald, argued in favor of the viewpoint of a German
waiver of immunity due to the breach of fundamental international law norms. She also contended a
new view of universal jurisdiction. Contending that violations of international law no longer is only a
subject of relevance to the national state, but is part of a wider global interest, Judge Wald took
recourse to the examples of the statutes as well as the case law of the Nuremberg and Yugoslavia
Tribunals, and the Eichmann case from the national sphere. When it comes to the intention
requirement, Judge Wald made a parallel to a “foreseeability test” – meaning that the violating state
should know that such a behavior could only end in responsibility for the conduct at one point.
Apparently though, the dissent is not keeping to the strict legal basis in this argument, thus confusing
the principle of state responsibility that is part of international law, with the possibility of prosecuting
foreign states in national courts under international law.
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now holds a decent number of indictees and defendants in detention.
Additionally, the Genocide Convention does not provide for universal
jurisdiction for trying perpetrators of acts of genocide. Criminal procedures
have anyway been held in a number of civil law countries in Europe against
war criminals from the former Yugoslavia, while common law countries
have showed reluctance in prosecuting Balkan offenders.45 A case in point
is the Tadic v. Karadzic case46 which concerned charges of “genocide, rape,
forced prostitution and impregnation, torture and other cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment, assault and batter, sex and ethnic inequality, summary
execution and wrongful death” against Radovan Karadzic as the political
leader of the “Bosnian-Serb entity” in Bosnia. Before referring the case back
to the District Court, the court ruled that acts of torture or summary
executions in a private capacity were not to be regarded as violations of the
laws of nations. Only if committed with the distinct “pursuit of genocide
and war crimes” were they to be seen as in breach with law. 47 Canada’s
Criminal Code though, does entitle for universal jurisdiction in cases of
genocide. In particular during the 1980’s, common law countries, such as
the U.S., U.K. and Australia, did also try war criminals from the Second
World War and other seats of war such as Cambodia. The prosecution of
these persons was not based on some notion of universal jurisdiction from
the countries’ perspective, but was rather an extension of the extraterritorial
jurisdiction. The extension, however, showed to be limited and only dealt
with these annotated conflicts. In recent years there has been an upswing in
U.S. domestic courts for cases dealing with international war criminals,
although not on the basis of universal jurisdiction. In accordance with the
rules set forth in the Geneva Conventions, states are required to adopt
national legislation for the facilitation of prosecuting war criminals. Austria,
Germany, Denmark, France, Belgium and Switzerland all made efforts to
prosecute alleged perpetrators from Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia.48
As regards universal jurisdiction among civil law states, Germany and
                                                                
45 Schabas, p. 366-7
46 Tadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1995)
47 D. J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 5th Edition, London, Sweet & Maxwell,
1998, p. 733
48 Schabas, p. 367
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Belgium have adopted the jurisdiction for war crimes, crimes against
humanity and/or genocide. France still lacks the provision in its Nouveau
Code Pénal, which nonetheless prescribes for prosecution of the most
serious offence in its code, the crimes against humanity. Belgium on the
other hand stands out as the most progressive among the European countries
in the broadness of its ability to prosecute international war criminals under
Belgian law. The Belgian statute not only implements what is stated under
the Geneva Conventions in that it considers all the grave breaches as war
criminals in both international and non-international conflicts, creates
imprescriptibility for these crimes, and also universal jurisdiction. The
Belgian War Crimes Statute from 1993 is therefore one of the few statutes
said to be “over-inclusive” rather than “under-inclusive” as the case is in the
majority of statutes around the world.49 This approach is not unproblematic
though, as the recent decision by the ICJ indicates in the case of DRC v.
Belgium.
2.6.1 EUROPEAN CONVENTIONS AND STATUTES
Leaving the sphere of national statutes, out of which the U.S. FSIA is still
the most progressive and significant, and case law on state immunity from
national courts, the 1972 European Convention on State Immunity is
currently the most thorough multilateral instrument on state immunity. As it
was codified in the early 1970’s, the Convention reflects a compromise
typical of the time, a period of division between the old absolute immunity
doctrine, and the more progressive, but still controversial restrictive
immunity doctrine. This way the principles of “restrictive adjudicatory
immunity”, of “strict territorial nexus requirements” and of “opting-out”
provisions with extensive immunity exceptions were combined in the
statute.50 The European Convention and national instruments such as the
FSIA, however represent a rare portion of actual enacted legislation, in a
field that is predominantly found in customary international law. Examining
the international law sphere for state immunity, the conclusion is inevitably
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that there is no explicit requirement of states granting foreign states
immunity from adjudicatory proceedings before their domestic courts.
Indeed, states can be sued and tried in foreign courts, but under certain
circumstances and not always. The negative rule provides exceptions of
immunity from commercial activities - acta jure gestionis. If consensus
seems to be strong on this point, there is some confusion when
distinguishing between private and governmental acts.51 Domestic immunity
statutes and most international instruments have stipulated clauses that do
not imply any differences between the private and official character of the
tortuous act. Even if they admit jurisdiction, they all call for strict forum
contact, prescribing a connection requirement linking the conduct to the
foreign state. The FSIA states an immunity exception in cases of non-
commercial torts only if the damage occurred in the U.S., extended though
by case law which requires both damage and act located to the U.S. In
Germany for instance, a different view is taken, leading to another
conclusion. Immunity would here be denied (on the basis of the
gestionis/imperii distinction) but only in commercial tort cases, with no
regard to where the tortuous conduct was committed. This way the approach
is cutting off jurisdiction over governmental acts traced to foreign states.
Under the opposite approach of the territorial nexus requirement in the U.S.,
non-commercial torts are observed as well, but with the necessary
relationship to the forum state. In relation to this approach no denial of
jurisdiction over foreign governmental acts as a principle is to be found.
This means that a domestic court could investigate human rights violations
that normally are organized through governmental involvement. And even
so, none of the two principles can be seen as comprehensive and prevailing
in practice, and the solution offered is to further try to combine them in
search for a way to find a balance between the two parties, the state and the
individual.52
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2.7 THE PINOCHET CASES
Pinochet No. 153 and Pinochet No. 3 one after the other, dealt with the issue
of immunity protection for a former head-of-state in relation to the
extradition charges, including acts of torture, hostage-taking, conspiracy to
commit these offences and murder, in accordance with the formal Request
for Extradition of the former dictator to Spain.54 After the “judicial review”
of the two warrants from 16 and 22 October 1998 had first been held in the
Divisional Court of the High Court, leave was granted for the lodging of an
appeal with the House of Lords. The law Lords in Pinochet No. 1 ruled in a
majority decision (by a vote of three to two) that acts of torture and hostage
taking were conducts that by their nature was exceptions to any immunity
protection, even for a former head-of-state. By an unprecedented
intervention, the House of Lords was asked to reverse the first decision
because of an unforeseen “intervener” in the case by Lord Hoffman’s
affiliation to Amnesty (actually a fund raising project for charity), which
was considered to be a party to the case.55 Thus disqualifying the first
judgment, a board of this time seven new law Lords was constituted in
January 1999. The reasoning of the new decision that also held that Pinochet
did not have immunity is a complex pattern covering U.K. legislation,
common law and international law, and identifying seven diverse lines of
interpreting the applicable law. Lord Goff was the only law Lord to entail
the former head-of-state Pinochet, as any other public official, immunity
ratione materiae. Only in an instance where the acts would have been
carried out in a private capacity, for unofficial ends would he have been
considered to loose his immunity.56 Moreover, in Lord Goff’s opinion, the
priority to sovereign immunity as a norm well established in international
law, was higher than that to the stipulated principle of “repression” of
crimes stipulated in for instance, the Torture Convention. 57 The majority
                                                                
53 R. v. Bow Street Magistrate, Ex Parte Pinochet, [1998] 3 W.L.R. 1456; 37 I.L.M. 1302 (1998)
(hereinafter Pinochet No. 1)
54 Initially the warrants for extradition were issued in Spain, and later on the 16 October 1998 they
were re-issued by a London magistrate.
55 In re Pinochet, [1999] 2 W.L.R 272; 38 I.L.M. 432 (1999) (hereinafter Pinochet No. 2)
56 Jan Klabbers, ’The General, the Lords, and the Possible End of State Immunity’, Nordic Journal of
Law, 68, 1999, p. 88
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rather focused on the inherent incompatibility of immunity “co-existing”
with offences, committed under its protection, and considered conducts in
breach of international law not by any definition to be part of a head-of-
state’s official functions.58 Lord Millett ascribed personal immunity to
heads-of-state, as they symbolized state embodiment and could not be put
on trial since such an action would have been an insult to his country, in
accordance to the par in parem non habet imperium doctrine. Subject matter
immunity on the other hand was seen as available to both heads-of-state and
diplomats, and without regard being taken to the “rank of the office holder”.
In regard to the Convention against Torture, immunity of this kind could not
be reconciled with the purpose of the Convention. 59
The advocacy of the obligation erga omnes and jus cogens norms under
international law reflect the advancement into creating a normative system
where certain rights have been endorsed with higher content invoking moral
considerations and creating legal barriers. However desirable, the
controversial effect of emphasizing certain elements of customary
international law as opinio juris, creates a normative, “legislative”
backbone.60 Taking the example of the prohibition against torture, it is easy
to discern the clash between normative recognition of the hierarchical
supremacy of such a norm and state practice. This breach from the positivist
way of describing international customary law has also been developed by
academics. Deciding upon certain values, the international society sets itself
in the next step to promote and protect these ”interests” by transforming
them to rules. This “social process” of customs, in the international context
is therefore described as a constant “interactive” play, absorbing the wills
and contributions of states and transforming them to rules for the benefit of
all. Adhering to the autonomously created set of customs, states maintain to
divide their own private and political interests and relationships from
established “normative independence” and “legal system”. The key for
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solving this evolutionary imbalance is the interest states nevertheless have
put into the future existence and maintenance of the customary approach of
international law. 61
The removal of Pinochet’s immunity was not construed to eliminate the
state immunity of the sitting heads-of-state. Nevertheless, as a non-intended
effect of the Lordships decision, the state of Chile may now be brought
proceedings against in other countries, and thus, have its state immunity in
part removed or weakened.62 As for Pinochet personally, had he still been
the head-of-state in Chile, he would have enjoyed the immunity protection
as would he in the position of a former head-of-state if the acts had
constituted functions of his office. There would not have been any obstacles
to threaten his position, and the immunity ratione materiae would have
prevented him of being arrested, judged or condemned in his official
capacity as a head-of-state under civil as well as criminal law for conducts
in breach of international criminal law. Once he has stepped down from
power, the issue seems to be another, and the immunity protection seizes to
cover at least acts that were not committed under his official functions, but
rather as private acts, thereby not being covered by international and
national law. 63 All in all, it is important to make sure that the word
immunity does not become a synonym for impunity when dealing with
crimes of this sort and at this level. 64
2.7.1 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Taking the case from the concrete sphere to the abstract, where it is
suggested it should have been held from the start, one may wonder why,
more practically, immunity law still exists with such a strong emphasis. The
parallel to the diplomat working abroad, in need of some extra-territorial
defense, is not valid, since the state normally functions within its own
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borders. The immunity protection makes more sense from the political
viewpoint and it is perhaps no surprise that the British Home Secretary
under the Extradition Act at the end refused the extradition of Pinochet
based on his medical state, in a manner perhaps flavored with a bit of
‘realpolitik’. Be that as it is, the conclusion that could legally be drawn from
the Pinochet decision, is not that heads-of-state violating human rights have
more to fear in the future, but rather that immunity law is in need of
reformation, because as derived from the Pinochet cases, it has lost some of
its momentum. 65
2.7.2 AFTER PINOCHET – THE DRC-BELGIUM CASE
The judgment by the ICJ in The Hague on 14 February 2002, ruled that the
arrest warrant that a Belgian court had issued in absentia against Mr.
Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, the former foreign minister of the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), in accordance with its domestic law, was in
violation with international law. Failing to respect the immunity that the
minister enjoyed from for instance foreign criminal jurisdictions by
customary international law, Belgium was forced to cancel the arrest
warrant. The issue was not whether the warrant was unlawful and in breach
with international principles regarding jurisdiction, thus rendering the
Belgian law itself illegal, but rather, whether the circulation of such an arrest
warrant did violate the ministerial immunity of the foreign minister and
thereby put the lawfulness of the warrant at stake. Belgium’s legal
obligations towards DRC had been violated because of the disrespect of his
immunity, immaterial of the fact of whether the acts charged with were
committed in a private or official capacity, and whether the minister, at the
time of the arrest, is abroad due to private or official matters. In its
judgment, the ICJ did not rule on the issue regarding the legislation itself, or
its universal and “long-arm” character. Having in mind the special criteria of
the ICJ decision, that is, that it only applies to Belgium and not third states,
that it addresses merely foreign ministers’ immunity concerns in criminal
proceedings, it may still send signals abroad affecting for instance the U.S.
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ATCA statute and whatever future processes against government officials in
extraterritorial jurisdictions.66
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3 International Crimes and
International Prosecution
3.1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
Before one goes into the legal statutes and record of international criminal
law, it would be helpful to somewhat go through the scope and conduct of
international criminal law, although some positivist scholars might call it a
supposition, a set of rules and principles that in fact do not exist. A positivist
approach merely recognizes torts that are classified as “international crimes”
as crimes under municipal law. The international aspect is the one that
judges the legal setting of the status and extent of a municipal criminal law
that is used in prosecuting a national of a foreign state for crimes committed
outside the territory of the forum state. Opposed to this, a naturalist
approach sees international crimes as by definition international, only
seeking a forum for prosecution under international criminal law among the
domestic courts. With the coming into existence of the ad-hoc tribunals for
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the dichotomy is not that interesting,
since the tribunals exist through a mandate from the Security Council, and
operate by an international statute defining the crimes. The same is true for
the ICC statute, which receives its jurisdiction and the crime definitions
from international law. Crimes that are not within the realm of the
international tribunals and their jurisdictions may be prosecuted in national
courts, depending on whether the state has ratified co-operation treaties and
conventions where the definition of the crimes and jurisdiction is prescribed.
In doing so, the creation of a system of universal jurisdiction is realized, by
which punishment of perpetrators is globally secured by the states parties.67
If a possibility to act as a prosecuting state does not exist, most treaties offer
the alternative of extradition or submission of the suspect to another
jurisdiction. As to the definition of “international crime”, it is required that
it fulfills both requisites, it has to be a “crime”, and identified by
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“international law”. Customary international law, which covers a field larger
than only the legislated when it e.g. looks at the effect of a convention on
for instance states that have not ratified a convention, shows no “definite
list” of international crimes.68
Some of the crimes have also achieved a status of jus cogens, such as
aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, piracy, slavery
and torture. This would mean that any instigation of such conduct by states
would immediately outlaw such conduct. Apart from the jus cogens
regulations, there exists a set of “core crimes” as well, included in the Rome
Statute of the ICC, endowing only the crimes of genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes and aggression with a deeper, more profound
                                                                                                                                                                    
67 John F. Murphy, Civil Liability for the Commission of International Crimes as an Alternative to
Criminal Prosecution, Harvard Human Rights Journal, Vol. 12, Spring 1999, p. 3
68 A recent table of offences under international law by Jordan Paust et al. in the International
Criminal Law Review 11 (1996) presents the following “protected areas”:
A. Protection of Peace
      1. Aggression
B. Humanitarian Protection During Armed Conflicts, the Regulation of Armed
Conflicts, and the Control of Weapons
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20. Theft of Nuclear Materials
H. Protection of Communication Means
21. Unlawful Use of Mails
22. Interference with Submarine Cables
I. Protection of Economic Interests
23. Falsification and Counterfeiting
24. Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
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significance and willingness to prosecute.69 As regards prosecution and
extradition regulations in conventions, the 1949 Geneva Conventions hold
certain “grave breaches” as universal and universally extraditable. Every
state is requested to enact legislation accordingly, prosecute offenders in
domestic courts under fair trials or to extradite them. 70 Looking back it is
easy to notice the reluctance and hesitant manner in which states have
approached the prosecution of core crimes. The Yugoslavia and Rwanda
Tribunals are the first international criminal law systems to deal with these
crimes in a serious manner since the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials.
However, the effectiveness of the newly implemented international
permanent tribunal is at stake regarding the prosecution of these crimes.71
There exists a whole set of barriers and obstacles with a possibility for states
to “opt out” of the Court’s jurisdiction, and a “consent regime” indicating
that, in order for the tribunal to be able to exercise its jurisdiction, it is
necessary that the state where the atrocity has been committed as well as the
state of nationality of the alleged offender, give its consent to the tribunal. In
a concrete situation that would imply a possibility of prosecution only
against a person who has committed any of the core crimes in a foreign
state, contrary to practice in general, where most of these crimes are
committed by states within their own territories against their own people/s.
3.2 CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES – ILC
DRAFT ARTICLES
The concept of international criminal responsibility for individuals was first
endorsed under international law in the Nuremberg Trials. Previously states
have always been regarded as the sole subjects of international law. As a
prevailing political concept, the liability of individuals took over as may be
seen in international instruments such as the 1954 Draft Code of Crimes
against the Peace and Security of Mankind by the ILC, the Genocide and
Apartheid Conventions, as well as the ICC Statute. With the drafting of the
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Draft Articles on State Responsibility, the approach towards state liability
was addressed in Article 19. Since there is a link between state criminal
responsibility and individual criminal responsibility, the two notions are in
some cases inter-exchangeable or even complementing. 72 While
subparagraphs a) and b) deal with state responsibility, c) and d) will be
implying a punishment of an individual instead of the state.73  Subparagraph
c) targets both states and individuals with liability consequences and
includes war crimes, and d) relates to individuals acting on their own or on
behalf of the state.74 Tomuschat confirmed in an ILC report on the Draft
Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind that apart from
states being held liable as “juridical entities” for crimes committed by them,
individuals in head-of-state positions in addition may be responsible for the
breaches “in their individual capacity”. 75
The ILC had long been preparing reports on individuals as subjects of
international criminal law. This position brought on criticism by Doudou
Thiam, the ILC Special Rapporteur, who defended the idea of harmonizing
the positions. These thoughts were elaborated in an analytical paper on the
Draft Code where the country representatives talked in favor of an advance
of the two responsibilities.76 Germany even articulated its position by stating
that “holding individuals responsible should not replace the responsibility
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under international law of a state which organized, committed or supported
such crimes”, and definitely not “preclude” the state responsibility. 77 The
U.K. on the other hand was reluctant to see any link between state
responsibility and individual criminal responsibility. For instance, a crime
such as that of aggression was more correct to sue as state responsibility
than as individual responsibility. 78 Arguing against the U.K. comment, it is
said that if the ILC has failed to create a distinction between state and
individual responsibility, it is only so because the “distinction is artificial”. 79
Examining the case of genocide, it is clear that both subjects can be held
liable. And indeed, reviewing case-law from the Tokyo and Nuremberg
Tribunals, and now lately, the UN ad-hoc Tribunals, individuals have both
been indicted on a vast scale for the acts of genocide and been found guilty
for the same as well. States, however, have not been even tried for their
involvement in genocide around the world. In the 12th ILC report on the
Draft Code in 1995 Belgium argued that state responsibility needed its place
in the Draft Code. Advantages of this inclusion would appear for instance in
cases of civil compensation suits to individual plaintiffs/victims.
Furthermore, by conferring liability on a state, there is less space for the
nation to restrict the blame to the government or state officials thereby
distancing themselves from the responsibility they carry as the electorate.
In 1954 the ILC concluded the work on its Draft Code listing 11 crimes out
of which the first seven were recognition of the precedent of the “crimes
against peace” in the Nuremberg Statute, which had transformed into
customary law as the worst crimes of international criminal law rendering
the hardest punishments. The Code was moreover an attempt to differentiate
between acts incurring state responsibility – all the crimes except one – and
individual responsibility. In 1991 the new Draft Code took on an expansive
approach, including pretty much any possible crime, regardless of whether
or not it was endorsed in international law. This approach proved not to be
                                                                                                                                                                    
paragraph 256 of the report of the Commission on the Work of its Thirty-Fourth Session,
A/CN.4/365, 25 March 1983
77 A/C.6/36/SR.60, para. 26, and A/37/325, 9, paras. 13, 15
78 Jorgensen, p. 142
79 Jorgensen, p. 143
32
very successful from a viewpoint of identifying the correct liability modes.
The mixture of crimes was not consequently composed and did not take into
consideration which subject of international law was targeted for liability –
states, government officials or individuals.80 The 1995 Draft Code therefore
presented a slimmer Nuremberg Statute version, basing the listed crimes on
two criteria: “extreme seriousness and international community
recognition”. 81 It was thereby distancing itself from crimes that were not to
be found as established in the codex of international law. The legal input
came from the recently adopted Statute for the ICTY and the Secretary
General, implicitly creating an invitation for the international humanitarian
law to be included, and affirmed as customary law. 82 This standpoint,
accompanied by the nullum crimen sine lege principle, was making sure that
a consensus on the field of international humanitarian law would prevail,
not leaving any space for countries to deny adherence on the ground of
different conventions.83 The criteria for the 1994 Draft Statute of the ICC
were set up to distance it from the Draft Code, by the inclusion of “treaty
crimes” directly in the text, whereby a clear recognition of treaties as de
facto law was intended, and also an atmosphere of “international concern”
as well as a thorough juridical framework of extradition requirements,
universal jurisdiction and prosecution. By reaching out for a larger and more
cohesive sphere of crimes than only the crimes against peace and security
known from the Draft Codes, the Statute evidently tried to foresee the
operative level of the ICC on a larger scale.84 The 1996 Draft Code presents
different modes of liability depending on the nature of the annotated crimes.
The ICC has found that it is more efficient to target individual
representatives of governments than the state itself. Both the Nuremberg
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Statute and the Draft Code admit individuals being prosecuted for acts of
state, that is, when holding the capacity of a governmental official, a head-
of-state, or military leader. Since the individual responsibility is derived
from the state’s conduct, some suggest, it would be “logical” to state that the
two responsibilities correspond and are identical. The punishment of these
two subjects will have to differ though, since it is not possible to, for
instance, punish a state to imprisonment for a criminal act. It will need to be
held liable in a “civil sense” for the criminal offense, as exemplified in the
case Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia before the ICJ. Another question is
why such double liability exists, and what possible purpose it would make
to punish an individual instead of the state entity. Oppenheim’s
International Law acknowledges that in the case of war crimes, entailing
responsibility to individual agents is a way of punishing the state. Should a
state agent commit international crimes, the responsibility will be held by
the state, if the conduct was performed under the control of the government.
Hence, should a head-of-state individually face charges against his conduct,
and be held liable for the offences, it will be viewed as an indirect
punishment of the state.85 The Milosevic indictment is the first of its kind
against a head-of-state still in power at the time of the drafting and filing of
the indictment. In arguing this connection between the individual and the
state, caution needs to be observed. State responsibility is bound to exist
even if the individual agent is not put on trial. An act that is causing
individuals criminal responsibility could by a presumption also engender
state responsibility, if the setting is adequate for such legal liability. 86 It is
not reasonable to create a situation where the guilt of a state is hidden
behind the liability of an individual. From the point of view of the victim
state, it is also uncertain whether the prosecution of an individual can
actually amount to a satisfactory reparative action for the guilt of a state
sponsored campaign of violations of human rights and humanitarian law. 87
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3.3 PUNISHING A STATE – IMMUNITY FOR HEADS-OF-
STATE
The reparative actions available to a state against which it has been
committed a wrongful act, are declaratory judgments, satisfaction,
restitutions, and compensation. 88 The “collective guilt” of the breaching
state that the remedies in a way presuppose, especially if one is inclined to
see the remedy as a punishment, still has to be carefully examined in order
not to expose it to a different layer of retaliatory actions such as sanctions,
countermeasures and other measures.89 It is necessary to assess whether the
whole population should be treated as an accessory to the government or the
regime, even if it is, in a worst case scenario, dictated by an autocratic
regime which is maybe also oppressing its own population. 90 It is self-
evident that such remedies should contain elements of punishment, but also
of prevention and correction. If the punishment should target an innocent
group, the whole purpose of it is left out, and components of personal justice
and social prevention are not fulfilled.91
The establishment of the ICC was first initiated firmly when in 1991 the
General Assembly in its Resolution 46/54 brought forward the idea of such
a court and investigated whether there existed a will or even consensus for
such a creation. Consequently, the ILC followed up with Reports by its
Special Rapporteur 92 and workgroups that resulted in the Draft Statute for
an International Criminal Court (1994). The Draft Statute made no mention
of “state responsibility” though, a sort of legacy derived from the ad hoc
tribunals’ statutes. In contrast to this, a Committee of Experts on the
Establishment of a Permanent Criminal Court met and coordinated their
findings in the second “Updated Siracusa Draft” from 1996.93 It amended
Article 33 of the ILC Draft, which stated under paragraph 4 that state
responsibility for criminal acts should not be prejudiced by individual
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responsibility. The same approach was later adopted in Article 25(4) of the
Rome Statute. In theory, the possibility of an expansion of the ICC
jurisdiction to include states is also conceivable and would be the ideal
solution to combine the “substantive issues” of state criminality and the
more procedural aspects of it. Until the ICC is running properly, the ICJ and
other ad hoc tribunals would be able to award punitive damages to states
when called for.94 As previously noted, sovereign immunity is activated
when a crime is committed against a foreign domestic law, or even human
rights violations and breaches against international law in general. Even
though the restrictive theory on sovereign immunity is prevalent today, 95
states are as a presumption immune from criminal suits abroad.96
3.4 STATE RESPONSIBILITY, THE GENOCIDE
CONVENTION AND THE ICJ
The Genocide Convention mainly contemplates the individual liability for
crimes of genocide. States, however, are not addressed as such, even though
they often stand as the main perpetrators and initiators of genocide as well
as of other crimes against the laws of war. It is the nature of the act that
somehow requires for a state to be involved. The Convention does mention
States and imposes obligations on them, but does not provide for any
possibility of holding them directly guilty for acts of genocide.97 There was
considerable activity among the states of the UN Sixth Committee in 1948
during the drafting and amending of the Genocide Convention and these
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distinct views on the Convention emerge in the numerous debates and the
travaux préparatoires.98 France strongly emphasized the need for an
international court, but held that the Genocide Convention was only
supposed to target individuals, and not states. The UK had a totally reversed
opinion, searching for a way to prosecute states through the Convention
rather than individuals. UK made its first suggestion to incorporate criminal
responsibility for states and governments in the amendment to Article V99
and VII100 of the Genocide Convention. The amendments were rejected, but
once again proposed when debating Article IX. The UK amendment sought
for a connection between the deterrent to states for involvement in genocide
and the “maintenance of peace”.101 Including states and governments was
“imperative” to make the Convention optimal.102 UK’s approach was
supported by other countries such as Belgium, which suggested a link and
recourse to the ICJ for cases of state responsibility in the Genocide
Convention. The crux then and now, is that states are not subjects to
criminal law and do not obey to the same principles of criminal
responsibility as individuals. Under civil law states are obliged to provide
material reparations as the only punishment.103 During the debate on the
drafting of Article IX, France supported the new joint UK/Belgium
approach for a submission to the ICJ of any “disputes relating to the
responsibility of a State for any of the acts enumerated in articles [I] and
[III]” as long as it was a question of civil responsibility. 104 The UK/Belgium
amendment was adopted, again after some confusion regarding whether it
was involving any criminal responsibility of states under the Convention,
but after the UK assurance and clarification that it was indeed a suggestion
for international civil responsibility of states violating the Convention, the
amendment was adopted.105
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3.5 BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA V. YUGOSLAVIA
The litigation between Bosnia-Herzegovina and FRY before the ICJ, is a
case which has been pending before the Court for almost a decade now.
Bosnia-Herzegovina filed its application to the ICJ on 20 March 1993
charging FRY with violations against the 1948 Genocide Convention. The
charges were based on Article IX of the Convention as the jurisdictional
basis of the Court and invoked Articles I to V of the Convention that FRY
had allegedly violated. Bosnia-Herzegovina also sought several provisional
measures under Article 41 Statute of the ICJ to be activated against FRY in
order to make it cease all acts of genocide against Bosnia-Herzegovina. The
Court argued that Article IX provided it with the jurisdictional basis,
however, refusing authority on the other grounds opined by Bosnia-
Herzegovina.106 On 27 July 1993, Bosnia-Herzegovina filed a new request,
this time for provisional measures to the effect that it would prevent the
commission of acts of genocide under the Convention, by admitting Bosnia-
Herzegovina a recourse to military weapons, equipment and supplies.107
In the Memorial108 filed by Bosnia the argument was based on Article IX
and involved state responsibility on three different levels. First, state
responsibility was invoked for acts of genocide as described under Article II
and Article III. Second, responsibility for a state could be triggered by
breaches of obligations set out in Articles I, IV, V and VI, when the state
failed to prevent acts of genocide through the organs and instruments of the
domestic legal system. Third, Articles I and IV also invoked state
responsibility when the state failed or refused to bring individual
perpetrators to trial. Article IX was seen as the proper basis for states to
along with a whole range of individuals be determined liable or not for the
failure of preventing and punishing the perpetrators of the acts of
genocide.109 Bosnia stated that inferring the question of whether the state
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actually had committed an act of genocide, and thus criminalizing such a
state, was an entirely separate one, i.e. part of the issue of accountability for
criminal acts that does not exist under the Genocide Convention. FRY
agreed in its preliminary objections to the jurisdiction of the Court, that a
state is responsible when failing to punish or prevent acts of genocide.110
Additionally, FRY contended that, since the conflict was being waged in
certain parts of Bosnia where FRY did not have any jurisdiction, it
constituted a domestic problem of Bosnia with no connection to FRY. It
asserted that the Bosnian Memorial was based upon an erroneous
construction of the Genocide Convention, supported by “submissions” that
were not within the scope of the Convention. Consequently, FRY stated that
there could be no international dispute under Article IX, and hence no
jurisdiction for the Court over the case.111
The ICJ however concluded that Article IX did in fact provide the Court
with jurisdiction in this case, and briefly indicated its reasons and the
rejection of the of the 5th Preliminary Objection of FRY by eleven votes to
four. It is not a hindrance for state responsibility when Article IX refers to
“the responsibility of a state for genocide or for any other acts enumerated
in Article III”. Nor is Article IV, which deals with individual responsibility
of “rulers” or “public officials”, meant to exclude the responsibility of
states.112 The Court continued to indicate the extra-territorial applicability of
the Genocide Convention without any limitation to a state’s obligation to
prevent and punish acts of genocide outside its territory under Article VI.
The Court never went as far as to affirm any state responsibility for the
commission of genocide or responsibility “for acts of its organs”, but merely
implied that the Convention did not exclude such a form of liability.113 After
all, it was not necessary for the Court to make a closer assessment of this
issue at that time, but its conclusion that, since there exists a disagreement
between the parties on the direct state responsibility over acts enumerated in
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Articles I and III automatically makes Article IX to cover the litigation, is
“sufficiently equivocal”. 114 What did the Convention actually have in mind?
As previously indicated, the drafters of the Genocide Convention more than
half a century ago, debated rather vividly the scope and interpretation of
Article IX, and may have left the issue of state responsibility to be solved
through the evolutionary process. Such a regard to the concept of inter-
temporal law would encourage to a more flexible and balanced approach by
the ICJ to address the implementation of Article IX. 115 It is suggested in the
literature that when a court has to apply a rule or an article, it should refrain
from only making an assessment from a static perspective, and rather
attempt to reach a conclusion from “within the framework of the entire legal
system prevailing at the time of the interpretation”. 116 This question is
particularly interesting and important in cases involving human rights and
has been raised in a couple of cases before the ICJ. Bosnia did invoke other
grounds for jurisdictions as well, based on international law on war and
international humanitarian law by means of the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
Protocol 1 of the Geneva Conventions, the 1907 Hague Regulations on
Land and Warfare, and the Nuremberg Charter, the Judgments and
Principles. Even though the Court dismissed these additional grounds,
because it was not prima facie established, all the Conventions address state
responsibility (although all do not admit recourse being taken to the ICJ).
Moreover, obligations erga omnes advocate a compliance with the
Conventions, and thus also with the Articles addressing state responsibility.
As for the Genocide Convention, the ICJ ruled that the rights and
obligations stipulated are also obligations erga omnes. When interpreting
the Court’s rejection, it seems though, that only alleging the existence of an
obligation erga omnes117 to comply with the Genocide Convention, or any
of the other Conventions dealing with state responsibility for war crimes,
would not have presented a sufficient ground 118 for jurisdiction. 119
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Through the Bosnia v. Yugoslavia case the ICJ is inevitably approaching the
domain of an emerging principle of state accountability for international
crimes such as genocide. By avoiding the criminal responsibility of a state
for genocide, it is admitted to award punitive damages, which would include
a criminal consideration, and still not force itself into a “quasi-legislative”120
field. The ICJ can not ignore the re-emergence of state responsibility in
relation to the Bosnia case, and should interpret it as a “crystallization” of
the first stage in the development towards a final concept and principle of
state liability for certain commissions, among which the acts of genocide
present the most severe.121
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4 ICTY and Slobodan
Milosevic
4.1 THE KOSOVO INDICTMENT
What does it mean when scholars and Balkan analysts, discuss Serb or
Yugoslav politics, and instead of using the name of the state, almost
exclusively formulate the points in the manner of “Milosevic started a
counter-attack…”, 122 “… the Albanians had started fighting with
Milosevic…”, 123 “… the world community condemned Milosevic’s counter-
offensive…”124 (my emphasis added). Surely president Milosevic did not
himself personally wage a war in Kosovo, shooting, raping or expelling any
ethnic Albanians from the country. Talking about the aggressions and
violations committed, as a one man’s work hopefully does not provoke any
such insinuations. Apart from being a stylistic way of expressing oneself,
the formulations motivate in more ways for an explanation. After all, it is
Milosevic who stands trial in The Hague, charged in the Kosovo Indictment,
the first indictment of three filed by the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP),
with crimes against humanity and violations of the law and customs of war,
individually or in concert with the President of Serbia, Milan Milutinovic;
the Deputy Prime Minister of the FRY, Nikola Sainovic; Chief of the
General Staff of VJ, Colonel Dragoljub Ojdanic; and the Minister of
Internal Affairs of Serbia, Vlajko Stojiljkovic,125 all accused by virtue of
their positions in FRY during the relevant period of time.
4.1.1 ARTICLE 7(1)
As the President of FRY at all times relevant to the Kosovo Indictment,
Milosevic is regarded as the main perpetrator and responsible for the
military campaign and strategic co-ordination of the commissions in Kosovo
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from 1 January 1999 until 20 June 1999.126 According to Articles 3, 5 and
7(1) of the Statute of the Tribunal, the indictees “planned, instigated,
ordered, committed, or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning,
preparation, or execution” of the crimes charged with. 127 Each and one of
them is, apart from being individually responsible for the commission of
these crimes, also responsible in the position of a “co-perpetrator” in the
participation of the “joint criminal enterprise”, a plan construed with the
purpose to expel “a substantial portion of the Kosovo Albanian population
from the territory of the province of Kosovo”, also known as “ethnic
cleansing”. This “criminal purpose” was fulfilled by the use of “the de jure
and de facto powers available” to the accused in their positions.
Additionally, the accused “shared the intent and state of mind” for the
commission of all the crimes enumerated in the five counts of the Kosovo
Indictment. The crimes were “within the object of the joint criminal
enterprise” alternatively that the consequences of the commission were
”natural and foreseeable”. 128
4.1.2 ARTICLE 7(3)
Article 7(3) is also available to ascertain someone individual criminal
responsibility for the acts of their subordinates, if he had reason to know or
suspect that the subordinates were violating international humanitarian law,
and “failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts
or to punish the perpetrators”.129 Milosevic’s command responsibility set
out in §§20-28, takes the point of departure in the fact that Milosevic was,
apart from President of FRY from 15 July 1997, also holder of a number of
de jure positions, such as President of the Supreme Defense Council of FRY
(SDF). The SDF, consisting of the President of FRY and the Presidents of
Serbia and Montenegro, is responsible for the questions of national security
and defense, and decides over the Yugoslav Army (VJ). The power to
command and order the implementation of the National Defense Plan and
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the responsibility over the VJ was in Milosevic’s hand, as the Supreme
Commander of the VJ.130 This title derived from the FRY Law on Defense
also granted Milosevic power over “republican police units subordinated to
the VJ” during a state of emergency or war, which occurred on 23/24 March
1999 in FRY. 131 Through these positions, Milosevic had apart from the
control over the VJ and the Ministry of Interior (MUP) units, authority over
”military-territorial units, civil defense units and other armed groups”, i.e.
paramilitary units, and is hence criminally responsible for all the
commissions of his subordinates under Article 7(3).132 Milosevic’s de facto
control over the whole stratum of institutions in federal, republican and
provincial life acquired between 1986 and the beginning of the 1990’s is the
second set of positions examined. Federal institutions and organs, normally
under the control of the Assembly of the Government of the FRY were
controlled by Milosevic, as well as functions and institutions such as the
police force and the military force of the Ministry of the Interior (MUP),
otherwise to be found under the competence of “Serbia and its autonomous
provinces”. The media is in particular pointed out as a medium in FRY’s
political and economic life controlled by Milosevic.133 Milosevic acquired
these control positions through his official positions as the leader of the two
leading political parties that succeeded each other in power. From 1986 until
1990 he was the Chairman of the Central Committee of the League of
Communists in Serbia, and from 1990 until 2000 he was the President of the
Socialist Party of Serbia.134 Stemming from his control over institutions and
organs covering the entire political environment of the FRY, Milosevic’s de
facto control includes the influence over Kosovo, Vojvodina and
Montenegro, as well as their institutions.135 Each and one of the persons of
the joint criminal enterprise is responsible through their direction,
encouragement or support, for the systematic, deliberate and widespread
expulsion campaign against the Kosovo Albanian population, in order to
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create a continuance of Serb dominion over the province, the OTP alleges.
The climate and “atmosphere of fear and oppression”136 that the VJ and
other forces and units created in Kosovo, encompasses a variety of breaches
and violations of international law, principles and norms: the shelling of
towns, burning down and destruction of public and personal properties,
looting, destruction of cultural and religious sites, beatings, unlawful arrests,
harassment, sexual assault and killings. All these acts were committed with
the purpose to expel the ethnic Albanians from their homes and out of the
province, and was sealed with the forces of the FRY and Serbia robbing
refugees of their money, valuables and identity documents en route and at
the borders, intended to “erase any record of the deported Kosovo
Albanians’ presence in Kosovo and to deny them the right to return to their
homes”. 137 Some of the most heinous crimes are brought to the fore in the
five counts in the Kosovo Indictment, not genocide though. 138
4.2 THE PRE-TRIAL BRIEF, ADDITIONAL FACTS AND
BACKGROUND
65ter(E)(i) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence requests for the
prosecution to submit a pre-trial brief, elaborating on the charges and the
facts held against the accused. The core allegation is the criminal liability of
Milosevic for the expulsion and internal displacement of between 600.000
and 800.000 Kosovo Albanians in the FRY province of Kosovo.139 Kosovo
and the tragic development there during the few months in 1999 is seen as
the “book-ends” of a criminal campaign that lasted for over a decade, and
harvested over 200.000 killed in the wars in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina
and finally Kosovo. Gazing back at 24 April 1987, the prosecution creates a
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scenario featuring Milosevic as the arch-criminal, successively but
constantly accumulating power and control, extending it to all “segments of
society”140 with the sole plan of creating his very own mono-ethnic Greater
Serbia, ethnically homogenous state, concentrated to not only Serbia, but
also including Bosnia and Croatia.141
 In 1989 when Milosevic was the President of Serbia, the Serb Assembly
amended the constitution of Serbia, which had rested intact since 1974 when
Tito created the 1974 SFRY Constitution, decentralizing power to the six
constituent republics, and providing for substantial autonomy for the two
Serb provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, which then became autonomous
provinces. From 1974 until 1989 ethnic Albanians controlled Kosovo. The
Serb population kept decreasing from 40% to 10% of the total population of
the province.142 A new Serb constitution made sure Kosovo was
incorporated with Serbia again, revoking its previous autonomous
powers.143 As a result of this amendment, Milosevic allegedly expanded his
sphere of influence to the SFRY Presidency where he controlled eight votes
through the votes of the representatives of Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo and
Vojvodina. This “Serbian bloc” later constituting the “Rump Presidency”
when the Croatian, Bosnian, Slovenian and Macedonian representatives had
left the presidency on 1 October 1991, continued to enjoy the constitutional
powers such as the one of collective “Commander-in-Chief” of the
Yugoslav National Army (JNA).144 During the new repressive Serb reign
over Kosovo and its institutions, a project of altering the ethnical
composition was shaped, and soon stripped the ethnic Albanians of all their
previous rights and equal treatment as citizens of FRY. The Kosovo
Albanian population was forced into a shadow, parallel life, with own
institutions, schools and hospitals. Life got even more unbearable when the
expelled Croatian Serbs were re-placed into Kosovo. It is in this
environment that the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) saw its rise,
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especially after the collapse of Ibrahim Rugova’s peaceful resistance policy,
undermined by Milosevic’s refusal to discuss the future of Kosovo at the
Dayton negotiations in 1995.145 When the Rambouillet negotiations in
February and the Paris negotiations in March 1999 on a peace agreement for
Kosovo collapsed too, due to Milosevic’s obstruction again, and as a result
the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission left the country on 20 March 1999,
civil war broke out in the province between the KLA and the FRY
armies.146
Further amendments of the FRY Constitution in 1992 and the Republic of
Serbia Constitution in 1990 carved out new platforms for Milosevic to
exercise authority. The FRY Constitution mandated the President of FRY
with de jure authority over military and police forces, and with “primary
responsibility for the defense of the country” together with the Supreme
Defense Council and the President of the VJ, that is, the President of
FRY.147 All three functions remain inter-linked, constituting almost one
body. The control Milosevic thereby exercised by legal means over the VJ
and MUP was expanded through certain extra-legal features. Ignoring
higher de jure authorities, Milosevic exercised de facto control through the
Commander of the 3rd Army, General Nebosa Pavkovic, the Head of MUP
forces in Kosovo, General Sreten Lukic, or directly through the Federal
Deputy Prime Minister, and co-accused, Nikola Sainovic.148 This creates
two main military bodies in the FRY – the VJ and the MUP forces over
which Milosevic exercised total control. In 1998, during the prelude to the
war in 1999, MUP had the primacy and was responsible for neutralizing the
KLA. When Milosevic put General Ojdanic in command of the VJ and other
loyalists in top positions, the VJ was granted the leading role in Kosovo.
Apart from these two units, police, para-militaries, and other irregular forces
coordinated themselves under Milosevic’s command and fought against the
KLA, and later the NATO.149 The State Security Service had monitored
                                                                
145 Pre-Trial Brief, §27
146 Pre-Trial Brief, §35
147 Pre-Trial Brief, §36
148 Pre-Trial Brief, §9
149 Pre-Trial Brief, §40
47
Albanian activities in Kosovo throughout the 1990’s and had also a special
force unit, that was responsible for the armament of the paramilitary groups,
including, the now late Arkan and his Tigers. Their indirect connection to
Milosevic however remains unclear.150
The chain of command for the VJ can easily be drawn, but the MUP
structure remains still somewhat unclear. MUP’s connection to Milosevic is
transparent, but the multitude of units and sub-groups makes the chain-of-
command blurred, as well as the cooperation with the VJ.151 As to command
responsibility, the amount and size of the atrocities in the Kosovo war
makes it implausible for the government and Milosevic to disclaim
responsibility and knowledge. The ICTY Statute derived the concept of
command responsibility from military law, and it is now part of
international customary law and effects civil authorities as well, either
through their direct orders of illegal acts, or through the commission of their
subordinates.
4.3 INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE
CASE OF SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC
Milosevic is the most famous head-of-state to stand trial, prosecuted as the
top of the political and military brass of the FRY and pivotal mastermind of
the Yugoslav wars and civil wars – the master of chaos. At least the OTP
attributed him the supreme responsibility for tailoring the crimes against
humanity, war crimes and even genocide in the separate Bosnia
Indictment 152. In the Kosovo Indictment, the OTP has set itself to prove
Milosevic’s de jure and de facto authority, and as shown above, the de jure
control follows the constitutional patterns and legal eligibility in accordance
with the FRY and Serbian law. Milosevic did not violate any rules in
attributing himself the command over the military and police forces.
Proving his de facto authority on the other hand, critics, and former legal
advisors from the ICTY, predict will be a much harder task and process. It is
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one thing to show that he ordered certain things, but to show that he actually
misused his capacity that he knew about the monstrous killings, and in
addition did nothing to prevent and punish the perpetrators is a
“painstaking” project.153
4.3.1 INDICTING MILOSEVIC
The Kosovo Indictment was filed on the 27 May 1999 and the first time a
head-of-state still in power was indicted. As the peace talks on the war in
Kosovo were collapsing in France, the Kosovo Indictment definitely “pulled
out the rug from under the negotiating process”. 154 Prior to that, NATO
bombers had been involved in the bombardment of strategic objects, and as
it later was proved, not very strategic objects as well, such as refugee
convoys, TV-stations and other purely civilian targets.155 Before becoming
an “international pariah”, Milosevic was seen as the stabilizing factor during
the negotiations for the Dayton Agreement, and was seen as the key actor in
ending the wars in the former Yugoslavia. Western statesmen praised him as
the key figure to peace, and no one was even suggesting the thought of
indicting him for the wars in Croatia and Bosnia. After the breakdown of the
“sign or else we will bomb” negotiations in Rambouillet and Paris and the
escalation of the actual events on the ground in Kosovo by Serb troops,
almost everyone gave the appearance of agreeing that the Kosovo
Indictment was a terrific idea. This was however, contrary to vibrations
given by  “anonymous informants” in western capitals, and particularly
Washington. The U.S. State Department saw this as clearly counter-
productive for a negotiation solution, but soon found itself in a position
together with everybody else, where praise had to be shed over the
indictment.156 The probable conclusion is then that Milosevic would not
have been indicted, 157 had he signed the Rambouillet Treaty. 158 Louise
                                                                
153 Marlise Simmons, New York Times, 2 July 2001, New York Times,
www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/2001/0702mil1.htm.
154 Noam Chomsky, The New Military Humanism –Lessons From Kosovo, Pluto Press, London, 1999,
p. 104
155 Chomsky, p. 113
156 Ignatieff, p. 94
157 Steven Erlanger, 29 June 2001, New York Times –
www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/2001/0702mil1.htm.
49
Arbour, the former main prosecutor at the ICTY, who indicted Milosevic
denies that the timing of the Kosovo Indictment, which was the first
indictment to be filed against him, should have been suggested or ordered
by either NATO or the Security Council, and purports that the choice of
time was entirely her own. The only instructions she ever received from the
Security Council was to go to the top of the hierarchy, collect the relevant
evidence and finally indict the perpetrators. Full stop.159
At first the KLA was viewed by many, including Serb analysts, as a
provocation created by the Serbs themselves, in order to justify a military
retaliation against the Albanians. Having previously supported the non-
violent resistance in their parallel society under the leadership of Ibrahim
Rugova, many ethnic Albanians joined the KLA in the uprising that
followed, and struck most with surprise. Tim Judah states that the uprising
surprised both Serbs and Albanians. Soon the Kosovar guerilla force was in
command of 40% of Kosovo and the region was awaiting the second half of
what came to be the tragic expulsion of almost half the population of
Kosovo.160 The first half left FRY and Milosevic in a puzzled state of mind.
FRY, no doubt was a war-sick country161 by now, suffering from economic
sanctions, the largest number of refugees in Europe, and an international
label of being war criminals.162 Contemplating the international “green
lights” for the Serb Srebrenica massacre in 1993 and the Serb exodus from
Croatia in 1993, FRY might have anticipated the same passive reaction by
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the international community for yet another of these “population
exchanges”. 163
On 15 January 1999 FRY launched its counter-attack targeting the village of
Racak where 45 Albanians were murdered, and resulted in NATO initiating
its military campaign against FRY. Coinciding with the NATO
bombardment, the Serbian military campaign “Operation Horseshoe” was
executed. Whether it was a pre-staged plan, or a reaction and catalyst of the
NATO campaign is impossible to assess. That the Serbian leadership had
plans for an ethnic cleansing in Kosovo would not be surprising. A
statement by the NATO General Wesley Clark however, indicates that he
had never been informed of any “Operation Horseshoe”, and that the NATO
action “was not designed as a means of blocking Serb ethnic cleansing”, 164
rather leaves a bit of stunning confusion in mind, particularly since western
leaders claim that they knew about the Serb military operation in advance.
Such a testimony also gives at hand a bit of incriminating evidence
regarding the responsibility of the western leadership while doing nothing to
prevent or prepare for the effects, e.g. the anticipated refugee floods165 -
should it be true that they knew. 166
4.3.2 COMPETING VIEWS ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF
MILOSEVIC
The Yugoslav break-up in 1991 was taken to the fore by two competing
tendencies. The first was a quest for national emancipation and secession by
the Yugoslav republics, manifested in different ways. What they had in
common was the Communist leadership taking the lead, vested in newly
located nationalism. In Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Macedonia it took a centrifugal approach and resulted in the independence
of these republics. Serbia with Milosevic as the President, on the other hand,
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reached out for a conservation of the existent borders, because of the
intricate geographic composition and division of the Serbs in Yugoslavia in
combination with a pointed nationalistic message. The Serbian approach
coincides with the second trend, the federalist urge to maintain a certain
degree of centralism in the decision-making. 167 The first tendency, the
“exploitation of nationalism” produced a horrible scenario consisting of all
possible violations of human rights and humanitarian law, including
genocide, in order to create as much homogeneity as possible, and to secure
“a rule based on political extremism”. All the old Communist leaders, now
transformed into national icons, were “masters of the technology of power”,
as well as of abusing the political power.168 As the disintegration and the
wars succeeded each other and prolonged the chaos on the Balkans,
different political goals can be discerned. During the secessionist period the
political goals of the former Communist leaderships were different from the
goals of the “national elites and leaders” after the wars were already in
progress.169 It is just to acknowledge that there exists a difference between a
political leader in peace navigating its people into war, and the political
leaders and soldiers who find themselves at war.170 Where to place
Milosevic in this puzzle of trends and highly contradicting happenings is not
an easy task. If one were to critically examine the war scenario in Kosovo
exclusively from a political and legal viewpoint, OTP’s assessment appears
as factually wrong. 171 Not neglecting or minimizing the severity and tragedy
of the Serb treatment of the Kosovar Albanians in any way, it is literally true
that Milosevic sought to preserve Kosovo in FRY, and hence could be
described as having the political target, the end of the military campaign set
on the maintenance of what was left of the Yugoslav state. Constitutionally
and legally he had every right to claim what was rightfully “his” to protect.
Whereas the OTP concludes that both the end as well as the means were
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criminal, it is important to distinct the two terms and once again reverse the
focus on the legal sphere of admissibility that existed in FRY at the point of
time of the war. The means, no doubt proved their criminal and heinous
reality, but should be analyzed in its true arena. It was after all, the law that
legalized the gross and systematic violations of the human rights. The legal
context should by no means be trivialized.
OTP, however, created its own blueprint of the factual events, and will now
have to rely on aerial photos, intercepts and intelligence information
collected from the ‘intelligence-society’ – the CIA, FBI, DIA and the NSA
as well as wire-taps and apparently decisive radio-messages that the U.S.
had collected in May 1999 just before the filing of the Kosovo
Indictment.172 There is no classic paper trail at all to face Milosevic with. 173
So, was the Kosovo war but merely the final chapter of Milosevic’s
expansionist, genocidal tour around the former Yugoslavia, or was it, as he
himself claims an outcome of his urge to preserve Yugoslavia, as it had
been. Milosevic says he had no national ambitions or plan to create a
Greater Serbia, or to create an ethnically pure state. Being a Serb nationalist
is not correlative to the reality where Serbs lived dispersed in the majority of
the six republics, and therefore the only solution for the Serbs to live in one
country was to preserve it as one. That makes him a Yugoslav, not a Serb
nationalist.174 It can be stated in Milosevic’s defense that he is a tactic, not a
strategist, that he can only think and play one move ahead. And true enough,
the wars in the former Yugoslavia do not appear to have been planned in a
pre-mediated manner, or according to a systematic pattern. On the other
hand, Milosevic is often described as stubbornly consequent. Wherever
Serbs were involved in uprisings against their new independent host-
countries, he assisted and supported them.175 His engineering role, as the
President of Serbia, will be harder to prove for the wars in Croatia and
Bosnia, but Kosovo, very much at his heart, turned out to be another issue.
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A great part of Milosevic’s political success, he owed to his own support to
the Serb minority in Kosovo, and he would not let them down in the conflict
in 1999.176 As yet we do not know whether Milosevic alone, abused his
official positions by ordering actions in breach with international
humanitarian law, which would obviously strengthen OTP’s accusation of
individual responsibility. The other approach, which has been indicated
above, would be to assess whether the crimes committed were or became
part of a government/state policy and hence actions of gross and systematic
human rights violations depending on a state policy. Indeed, only focusing
on Milosevic does not seem to be a historically and politically correct point
of departure. Certainly not if one takes into account the actions of the
Yugoslav Presidency in 1989 and 1990, that was perhaps the main instigator
to the unreasonable reactions against the Slovenian and Croatian decisions
to leave the Yugoslav collective, quickly followed by Bosnia and
Macedonia. None of the persons, such as Borislav Jovic, that were part of
that Presidency have been indicted. None, except Milosevic. In correlation
with all characterizations of Milosevic’s regime as a form of “sultanism”, a
“web of extra-institutional political, economic, and coercive powers” a
stubborn elite regime refusing to follow the common Eastern European
pattern of transformation into social-democracy177 and rather feeding on
“political cannibalism” absorbing all the political programs in the country,
178 the answer to the question of accountability has to be found “within the
state structures” (my emphasis added) of the FRY. 179 There is deliberately
no reference to governmental action in the ICTY or ICTR. 180
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4.3.3 DEMONIZING A HEAD-OF-STATE – THE EASY
SOLUTION TO A CONFLICT?
“Guilt must be determined as individual, rather than collective” in the sense
that the guilty actors should be detected and exposed, but not for the sake of
finding one person to bear the whole responsibility. War crimes are always
part of a “policy of war”, where certain pre-conditions have to be fulfilled.
Even though the crimes against peace are not to be found among the articles
of the ICTY Statute, certain acts should merit if they were put in a pre-war
context, taking into consideration the fault and responsibility of the war-
mongering national elites and their media in all the constituent republics as
well as of the SFRY Presidency. 181 The demonization of Milosevic and the
unvaried portrayal of him as a “genocidal maniac”182 leaves too many actors
out of the picture: the media, the church, 183 the paramilitary militias that
were more than any other actor responsible for the war-mongering and
arousing of fear in the Serbian population in Croatia and Bosnia184 and
finally the state apparatus itself with all its policy makers and silent key
actors. Blaming everything on Milosevic is a transparently easy excuse
away from a holistic approach and may well fall short of cutting the bounds
between Milosevic and the Serb population if taking regard to the high
support for Milosevic in studies made in FRY. Before Milosevic was
extradited in May 2001, he had a support of 17,1% of the Serbs as the
person who had “done the most in the defense of the Serb nation in the wars
in the last decade of the 20th century”. 185 After his extradition and after the
trial in The Hague started, support for him was sky-high again. The
accompanying feeling of alienation that is currently underhand in Serbia is
also a factor that must not be neglected.
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4.4 ANALYSIS OF STATE/INDIVIDUAL
RESPONSIBILITY
Individual responsibility at the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals for crimes
can be divided into two poles or extremes. The first would be a principle of
“collective guilt” subsuming the individual responsibility, for instance by
the conception of “guilt by association”. Supreme Court Justice Robert
Jackson, the American prosecutor at the Nuremberg Tribunal used this
approach when he created his strategy for proving the Nazi state as a
criminal “corporate entity” consisting of “criminal organizations” and the
membership of individuals in them. The other end presents a contrasting
“individualization of responsibility”, where the complete negligence and
denial of the importance of a top political, military, administrative,
bureaucratic collective, treating it as a corporation consistent of a few
individuals. Also ignoring the policy of mass murder derived from the brass
collective, it would see it as a “series of individual murders”, and would
treat each individual as responsible for his own acts as in any other crime
case in time of peace.186 The tension that arose at the Nuremberg Tribunal
was caused by the clash between Justice Jackson’s strategy to prove the
guilt and conspiracy of the Nazi state as a collective entity, and the actual
prosecutions of the individuals, charged as individually liable for the actions
of the State. Invoking the act of state, as defense did not help the accused, as
the Nuremberg Tribunal promptly held that accountability for the
conception of collective responsibility, derived from U.S. law and
advocated by Justice Jackson, was not applicable.187
At the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), “the other
Nuremberg”, the conspiracy theory was made the focal point of the
judgments, where the collective instead of the individual actions were
examined. Even though the IMTFE did not succeed in creating any
systematic “general criteria of responsibility”, and totally failed to refer to
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any “particular findings” in the verdicts against the individuals accused,188
the concept of a conspiracy doctrine can generally be stated as useful when
dealing with cases lacking any culpable evidence, as at the IMTFE. 189  In
general this view has to be emphasized also because of the “very complexity
of modern governmental activity”. 190
Tuning in on recent cases of individual accountability for transnational
crimes, where the cases in whole would have merited by an approach that
would have focused on the policy-related actions of the state apparatus
rather than subsuming the collective guilt under one person some light has
to be shed on the Noriega case.191 General Manuel Noriega, a former CIA
confident, surrendered himself to U.S. troops and was arrested and brought
to the U.S. in 1990 after “Operation Just Cause”, the U.S. military campaign
and invasion of Panama, was ended. The operation itself was a violation of
Articles 2(4) and 51 of the UN Charter, as well as an incursion on Noriega’s
head-of-state immunity. He was indicted in February 1988, charged with the
engaging in a “criminal enterprise”, violating the U.S. domestic racketeering
and drug laws.192 Although not performing any illegal acts within the
territory of the U.S., the court adopted the “direct or substantial effect test”
from a previous judgment and concluded the effects of Noriega’s activity
too direct and substantial to be ignored, thus refusing to further contemplate
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the official status of Noriega as a head-of-state.193 The FSIA does not
mention exclusively head-of-state immunity in a criminal context and so the
court ignored the Act and turned to customary international law for
guidance.194 It took inspiration from customary international law providing
for head-of-state immunity related to official acts only, as well as the
dismounting of the act of state doctrine. In holding that Noriega’s actions
were not taken on behalf of the state of Panama and therefore could not be
seen as public actions, the Miami court made a similar differentiation
between jure imperii and jure gestionis acts as the Pinochet court, and
waived the head-of-state immunity.195 Accordingly, on 9 April 1992
General Noriega was sentenced to 40 years of imprisonment.196
A case such as the Noriega case, shows what political means strong states
have at their disposal when using law against persons that have fallen either
into disgrace, or just do not suit a political map any longer. It cannot be
desirable to base any rejection of the act of state on these premises. What
cases such as the Noriega and Pinochet decisions additionally fail in
addressing is the complexity of state sponsored crimes and the effect of
other factors that are not brought attention to. For instance, in the case of the
wars in the former Yugoslavia, institutions and elements such as the media,
the church, the intellectuals, as well as the tabooed collective responsibility
of the populations have failed to be examined. Such a profound analysis and
examination of whole societies is not possible to perform in a tribunal, and
has invited support for a truth and reconciliation commission. In an attempt
to avoid the individualization of guilt that is the effect of a criminal trial,
human rights activists have sought alternative ways to deal with the
problem. 197 “Truth telling” as an “obligation” to all the victims is in a way
more important than bringing justice.198 It is impossible to prosecute the
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majority of those who were actually part of the “conspiracy” of crimes
against humanity. 199  If using a tribunal, evidently the political leadership
has to be targeted. This is however not an unproblematic choice of making
justice as indicated. Important questions rise in connection to this. Will it
suffice to prosecute political leaders, military commanders and so on for the
committed crimes? How can in fact a few trials establish individual
responsibility and abolish or revoke the collective guilt? It is clear that the
guilt is not equally attributed to all involved, hence, it is just that those who
sponsored the crimes receive the lion’s share of the blame as well.200 A truth
commission for Bosnia or Rwanda it is stated, would not be a “meaningful
gesture”, since the crimes committed are not in dispute, but on the contrary
were blatant and well announced. Nothing stands as simple as that.
Acknowledged as they were by the perpetrators, the acts still prove to
confuse whole nations.201
Turning the recourse to the state level is not a novelty in the Yugoslav
context. Assessing the degree of individual responsibility is a hard, if not
impossible task as can be seen throughout history. The Japanese Generals
and politicians were sentenced to death without almost any culpable
evidence, and at the ICTY uncertainty rules regarding the evidence against
Milosevic. No victory should be taken out in advance, as the de facto
control accusations against him are reportedly week, and few people are
actually ready to testify against him. State responsibility and the concept of
state criminality have grown stronger and emerged recently as a general
principle of international law and customary international law. It has gained
relevance mainly through the drafting of the 1948 Genocide Convention and
the Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia case.202 Ascribing the words
“responsibility of a State” to an action – sponsored, committed as a state
policy – has not been detected to any other treaty after 1949. It is as if the
legislative community still is trying to grasp the vastness and importance of
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that single phrase, that even a state can be a villain,203 a pirate in the words
of the English Admiralty Judge, Dr. Lushington. 204 State responsibility is a
presumptive concept of law, “juridically feasible” as a conception of a
“criminal organization model” or a “corporate crime model”, a sort of joint
criminal enterprise in the language of the ICTY, but in the shape of the state.
It is possible to punish a state, or at least apply measures that provide the
same effect. Under the current international legal system the two legal
responses to state crimes are: a) “a declaratory judgment and/or an award of
punitive damages” by the ICJ, and b) trials of individual political and
military leaders before the International Tribunal. As for the future, a set of
important and significant alternative frameworks have emerged: a) a
possibility to include states under the ICC or establishing a “criminal
division” under the ICJ; b) a reformation of the ILC’s Draft Articles on
State Responsibility to include state criminal responsibility. In addition,
further development of state responsibility may be provided for through: a)
a ‘common law’ approach by courts and judges on both national and
international levels; b) “maturation of the concept of obligations erga
omnes”.205 Ascribing a state accountability for international crimes raises
almost metaphysical questions of whether morality can be attributed as well
to the state or/and international community. Hans Kelsen stands for the view
that if conducts can be imputed to a state, then so can morality, or “psychic
acts”, especially when the acts conducted are acknowledged as a “original
responsibility”. 206 “Therefore, not only those persons exercising authority in
a state but the state as a legal person in its own right must be shown to be
the subject of a moral code.”207 If such a concept would be assumed to exist,
then would international morality as well, created when different states’
domestic morality codes overlap.208 When states trespass these borders, it is
                                                                
203 Schabas, p. 437
204 Jorgensen, p. 279
205 Jorgensen, pp. 280-1
206 H. Kelsen, “Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law with Particular Regard
to the Punishment of War Criminals”, (1942-3) 31 California Law Review, pp. 530, 533; Jorgensen,
p. 281
207 Jorgensen, p. 281
208 Jorgensen, p. 281
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only natural that they should be held accountable for the conducts as well.
Not holding the proper entity responsible for the acts will only complicate
things for the future and make the prevention of such conduct impossible.
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5 Conclusion
What happens when a war ends, a war where atrocities have been replacing
each other for almost a decade, in the worst manner that Europe has
experienced since the Second World War. How then, when war has come to
an end, does one create justice, promote lasting peace, make people tell and
acknowledge truth? These are difficult questions and issues, which take a lot
of courage, optimism and forgiveness to come to terms with. The
international community reacted at the atrocities in Yugoslavia after the
massacre in Srebrenica under the poignant leadership of General Mladic. It
has been argued that the ICTY reacted on the persons behind the acts more
than the deeds that would be the wrong way of approaching the problem.
This was made the elementary point even more when Milosevic was
indicted in 1999 after having refused to sign the Rambouillet and Paris
treaties. Internationally this was seen as a major achievement. When
Milosevic was extradited to The Hague in June 2001, critics were euphoric,
since there were really few who had ever thought this would be possible.
Moreover, the tribunal badly needed a big fish to raise its own prestige and
credibility with. They got the biggest fish of them all. All the time since the
filing of the indictment the backbiting and defamation of Milosevic had
been taking place; he became the incarnation of all the evils and horrors that
haunted the region when, like Pandora’s box, the war started one day in
1990. Voices acknowledge now that it would be a terrific thing to get hold
of Mladic and Karadzic as well, but basically, the ICTY is ready to close
business, sooner rather than later. The recently established ICC is a major
incentive here too. It is possible, but not desirable to have two tribunals that
could have the jurisdiction over the same field (in case new wars should
break out on the Balkans - ICC however, does not have any retroactive
jurisdiction).
It is not easy to argue against the prosecution of Milosevic, because,
doubtlessly, he is one of the main responsible politicians in the former
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Yugoslavia for the wars in the 1990’s. However, the pattern of
responsibility that the prosecution has created of his guilt does not provide
for an entirely convincing scrutiny of the historical, political and personal
motives or occurrences. It is certainly a dangerous endeavor to build a
whole case on one person the way the OTP has set its mind to do.
Scapegoats should not have a place in international law. While trials against
heads-of-state are made possible in international venues, they have become
restricted in a double sense in domestic forums. The U.S. has been the state
with the most generous legislation regarding civil suits and prosecution of
governmental officials, including heads-of-state, and states. Numerous cases
have been processed along this line, but with rather fruitless ends in the vast
majority of the cases since most of the judgments anyway cannot be
collected against the defendant. The bad experience with domestic courts
involving in trials regarding abuses committed abroad is a warning for the
future. Courts struggling with procedural and substantive issues such as the
Pinochet Courts put the problems of overcoming the obstacles with state
immunity in an even starker spotlight. In addition to this inherent obstacle of
success, the recent ICJ judgment in the DRC v. Belgium case, the Court
ruled out the legitimacy of the Belgian arrest warrant since it was based on
disrespect of the principle of immunity for foreign ministers, contrary to
international customary law. International law, as it stands firm today, does
not provide for issuing arrest warrants against governmental officials (it is
quite probable that one is correct in making the extension to heads-of-state
from the foreign minister in the Belgian case). Prior to the ICJ decision, the
two cases of Pinochet and Milosevic were steeling all attention. The
Pinochet ruling tried to distinct the difference between the official and
private sphere of a head-of-state, refusing to immunize him for actions not
naturally being part of his official capacity, such as torture, illegal arrests
and murder. Milosevic on the other hand, being indicted and tried by a UN
established body, found his immunity to be explicitly waived by the UN
Security Council, in order for the Tribunal to examine his individual and
superior command responsibility and guilt for the wars in Croatia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Kosovo.
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Alternative ways of seeking justice in the Balkans have been to combine or
substitute the ICTY with a Truth Commission. The approach of
acknowledging the complexity and intricacy of the conflicts is far more
important than hunting down one person, stigmatized for the sake of others.
After all, Slobodan Milosevic would not have reached this position had it
not been for the state apparatus, the structure of the legislation and the
government that left the field open for the means that were employed in the
wars. The target, goal of the military campaigns, especially with regard to
Kosovo, constructs a focal point in the defense of Milosevic as a head-of-
state, of his position more than his person. Milosevic’s objection that the
incentive with the operation was to preserve Kosovo as a Yugoslav entity
seems reasonable and credible. It is not obvious whether the OTP has made
clear the distinction, as it seems that it is more focusing on Milosevic and
the character and (negative) personality he produced. As the trial against
Milosevic is continuing, the Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia case is
also working at the international level by examining the charges of genocide
in the Balkans. The difference from the ICTY trials is that it is approaching
the issue of guilt from the state perspective, the only possible when dealing
with such grave allegations. Respecting the legislative, constitutional
powers Milosevic was rightfully in position of through his presidency, the
regime of violence in Kosovo must be viewed with the pre-text of a state
policy and not a single man’s work. Examining the state will bring
international law and criminal law much closer to the truth, and since there
can be no justice without the truth it is imperative to present the preferences
clearly from the start. It is evident that personalizing guilt can offer good
results. The legacy of the Nuremberg Tribunal pre-trial theory constructions
and the jurisprudence, shows how the assumption of “collective
responsibility” can be transferred to the actual perpetrators, star villains, the
group of criminals that represent the crimes and not the German people or
any other people, the former ICTY Prosecutor Richard Goldstone says.209
                                                                
209 Richard J. Goldstone, Fifty Years after Nuremberg: A New International Criminal Tribunal for
Human Rights Crimes , in Contemporary Genocides: Causes, Cases, Consequences , Edited by Albert
J. Jongman, 1996; Akhavan, p. 766   
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Positive law has not favored state responsibility in criminal proceedings,
although the act of state is clearly defined in international customary law.
The Genocide Convention is the iconoclastic tool here, providing for a
resort to the ICJ, should states find themselves involved in a dispute
regarding the interpretation of the Convention. During the drafting of the
Convention, it was not explicitly stated that Article IX did not imply any
criminal responsibility. Using this unique resort to the Court, an extension
of its competencies for the development of a criminal section is one
solution. Alternatively the newly established ICC could be provided with a
mandate to extend its jurisdiction to cover states in its field of work as well.
Either way will be a proper response to an issue that is becoming more and
more important and up-to-date with the development and current dilemmas
of international criminal law.
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